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LEGISLATION NOTE: HOUSE BILL 1363:
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE FOR NEWSMEN
In June, 1972, the Supreme Court ended years of speculation about whether the First Amendment gives newsmen
a testimonial privilege to protect the identity of confidential
news sources. The Court answered in the negative. This decision stimulated a campaign in the press for statutory protection, an alternative specifically suggested and approved
by the Court in the Branzburg v. Hayes opinion.1 Shield bills
were considered in Congress and in the legislatures of most
of the states, including Oklahoma. Several states enacted
shield laws and at first the press heralded each new law as
a victory. But as laws accumulated, newsmen began to take
a second look at the newly-acquired shield privilege and found
it less shiny than they had hoped. The shield laws almost
uniformly had holes which limited their protective potential
and exposed the press to future legislative interference. Disillusioned with the statutes, privilege-seekers began to consider alternatives, with the result that by the middle of 1973
states which had withheld the statutory protection seemed
more likely to satisfy the hopes of newsmen than states which
had obligingly passed shield laws.
Oklahoma was among the states which refused to enact
legislation. This note examines the Oklahoma experience in
the context of the national effort for source protection and
explores the possibilities for statutory'protection for newsmen
in Oklahoma in the future. Such an examination entails: (1)
a summary history of the search for source protection in Oklahoma and elsewhere; (2) an analysis of the protection afforded by shield laws and a comparison of the Oklahoma bill with
laws in other states; (3) an analysis of the current disenchantment with statutory protection and a discussion of possible
alternatives; and (4) an examination of the situation in Oklahoma in the light of national disillusionment and in light of
1

408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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a novel statutory approach proposed by a leading Oklahoma
newsman.
Denied Constitutional protection by the Branzburg decision, advocates of the testimonial privilege vigorously pursued alternative protection. Until recently, the effort concentrated on the enactment of shield laws in Congress and in the
states. Press groups and trade journals claimed that shield
laws were essential to protect the free flow of information
essential to a free society; that without shield legislation, news
sources would be afraid to talk.2 Advocates pointed to the
breaking Watergate scandal as evidence of the public's need
for confidential news informants and to the spectacle of newsmen serving indeterminant jail sentences for refusing to reveal sources as evidence of the immediacy of the danger. Fifty2 There is not complete agreement on the extent to which
newsmen rely on confidential news sources. For results of
surveys revealing wide differences in press practice see
Guest and Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969)
and Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study,
70 MICH. L.R. 229 (1971). For a recent study concluding
that sources probably dried up in the wake of Branzburg
but containing much data to the contrary, see Long, Are
News Sources Drying Up?, QUILL, March, 1973, at 10. For
a study which concludes that the volume of subpoenas to
newsmen has increased significantly in recent years, see
Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58
CALmF. L. REv. 1198 (1970).
The arguments in opposition to the grant of a testimonial privilege are based on several grounds. For an argument based on fear of abuse of the privilege see EDITOR AND
PUBLISHER, March 24, 1973, at 8, and April 7, 1973, at 26.
For an argument based on equal protection grounds, see
State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). For the traditional view that
society is entitled to every man's evidence, see 8 WiGMOPE,
ON EVIDENCE, § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961). For a summary of the arguments, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 691-708 (1972).
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nine bills were introduced in Congress3 ; five states passed
shield bills4 ; numerous other states considered protective legislation5 ; seventeen states already had shield laws on the
books. 6
Oklahoma was one of the few holdouts. The history of
the Oklahoma bill is instructive. As introduced, the Oklahoma
bill provided an absolute privilege, one of the most generous
irr the nation. The original bill provided:
No person shall be compelled in any proceeding or
hearing to disclose any information or the source of
any information procured or obtained by him while
he was engaged in publishing, gathering, writing,
editing, photographing or broadcasting news and employed by or acting for any newspaper, magazine,
periodical, wire
service or federally-licensed broad7
cast facility.
As amended in committee, the House bill provides that "the
privilege herein conferred shall not apply when such person
is a witness to the commission of a crime and provided further
8 NEwsw,

April 2, 1973, at 57. For a list of sponsors, see

EDITOR AIM PUBISHER, January
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § § 111-119
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-12.... (197..
§ 31-01-06.2 (Supp. 1973); OpE.

27, 1973, at 13.

(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973);
Cum. Supp.); N.D. CENT.
REv. STAT. § 44.040 (197374); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24.11.. (Supp. 197..).
5 For a summary describing the status of shield legislation
in fifty states, see U.P.I. REP., April 26, 1973.
6 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150-.220
(July 1973); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1972);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070
(West Supp. 1973); IND. AxN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); KY
REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1972); LA. REv. STAT. § 45:1451-54
(Supp. 1973) ; MD. ANN. CODE art 35, § 2 (1965); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANm. § 767.5a (1968); MONT. REV. CODE Am. § 93701-4 (Supp. 1973); NEv. REv. STAT. § 49.275 (1971); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-1-12.1 (1973); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney
Supp. 1972); OHIo REV. CODE §§ 2739.04, .11, .12 (1972); PA.
STAT. AN. tit. 28, § 330 (1973).
4

7 Hoqse Bill 1363, 34th Legislature, 1st Sess. (1973).
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that the privilege herein conferred shall not constitute a defense to any action for libel or slander."s These conditions
made the bill less attractive to newsmen who supported an
absolute privilege. When the bill came to the floor of the
House for consideration, the conditions mounted up. Amendments restricted the privilege to "legal" newspapers,9 eliminated photographers from protection, withdrew the protection given confidential information, and required reporters
to testify in contempt hearings for refusing to answer subpoenas or grand jury questions.10 The bill, as so amended,
was defeated, but was sent to study committee for review
and possible action in the next session.
The Oklahoma experience was typical of that in other
states and illustrated the reasons for press disillusionment
with shield statutes. Legislatures everywhere were unwilling
to grant the absolute privilege demanded by newsmen. Twenty-two states have shield laws. An examination of them reveals that only Michigan provides an absolute privilege comparable to that proposed in the original Oklahoma bill." Other
states extend the privilege only under certain conditions. Only
four states permit the newsman to keep secret the information received as well as the identity of the source; 12 the others
protect only the identity. Five states protect only published
material.13- Five states require disclosure when it would be
House Bill 1363, 34th Legislature, 1st Sess. (1973).
0 In Oklahoma, a "legal" newspaper must have a paid subscription circulation, must be admitted to the United States
mails as second-class matter, and must have published continuously and without interruption for 104 consecutive

8

weeks. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 106 (Supp. 1955).
10

Tulsa World, March 22, 1973, at B6, col. 2.

"

MicH. CoMn. LAws ANN. § 767.5a (1968).

Id.; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1972);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 3101-06.2 (Supp. 1973).
18 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1958); ApK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917
(1964); Ky. REv. STAT. § 421.100 (1972); MD. ANN. CODE art.
35, § 2 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANm. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1973).
12
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Three states require disclosure

when it would "serve the ends of justice"., Several states
have unique limitations. Arkansas requires disclosure if the
party seeking it can show bad faith or malice in the journalist.16 The New Mexico statute permits the courts to require
disclosure but specifies that the determination is to be made
with "due regard to the nature of the proceeding, the merits
of the claim or defense, the adequacy of the remedy otherwise
available, the relevancy of the source, and the possibility of
establishing by other means that which the source is offered as tending to prove."' 7 The Illinois statute is similar.'8
Tennessee grants the privilege but may withdraw it if the
information is available no other way. 1
The Pennsylvania statute includes a condition of the kind
which makes newsmen especially leery of limited privileges:
the privilege is conferred on radio and television newsmen
only if "the radio or television station maintains and keeps
open for inspection (emphasis added) for a period of at least
one year from the date of the actual broadcast or telecast, an
exact recording, transcription, kinescopic film or certified
written transcript of the actual broadcast or telecast., 20 From
such a provision, it is feared, it is a short step to requiring
reporters to keep (and to produce for grand juries, legislative committees, etc.) their notes, tapes, drafts, and manuscripts.
Some statutes are fraught with the threat of future conditions. Nebraska's governor signed a law in April, only oh
14

ALAsKA STAT.

§ 09.25.160 (July 1973); Aix.

STAT. ANN.

§ 43-

917 (1964); LA. REv. STAT. § 45-1453 (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 51, § 117 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24.11.. (Supp. 19....).
15 ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.160 (July 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-1-12.1 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (Supp.
1973).
16

ANN.
17 N.M. STAT. ANN.
ARK. STAT.

§ 43-917 (1964).
§ 20-1-12.1 (1973).

IsILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 51, § § 116-117 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
19 TEs.
CODE AN. § 24.11. (Supp. 19....).
20 PA. STAT.

ANN. tit, 28 § 330 (1973).
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condition that its sponsor introduce amendments in the next
legislature. 21
To newsmen, by far the most frightening feature of statutes is also the one common to them all: the fact that the
statute must define "newsman" and "news media." Common
requirements are that a newsman be regularly employed by
by a newspaper 22 or that his connection with the media be
for "gain or livelihood."23 Such definitions almost certainly
exclude free-lance writers, scholars, authors of books, researchers, speechwriters, and itinerate pamphleteers like Tom
Paine. Definitions of "news media" may be even more specific.
New York defines a qualifying newspaper as:
[A] paper that is printed and distributed ordinarily
not less frequently than once a week, and has done
so for at least one year, and that contains news, articles of opinion (as editorials), features, advertising,
or other matter regarded as of current interest, has
a paid circulation and has been entered24at United
States post-office as second-class matter.
The laws of Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana. New Mexico. and
Pennsylvania are only slightly less detailed. 25 The New York
statute is the only one that undertakes to define news: "written, oral or pictorial information or communication concerning local, national or worldwide events or other matters of
public concern or public interest or affecting public welfare."2 6
Congress has proved no more willing than the states to
provide an absolute privilege. At first, press hopes were high
that a federal absolute shield law would be enacted and would
21 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-12.... (197.. Cum. Supp.)
§ 09.25.220 (July 1973); LA. REV. STAT.
22 ALASKA STAT.
§ 45:1453 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (1973).
(1968); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
3 IwD. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733
§ 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1972).
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1972).
25 ILL. Ax. STAT. ch. 51, § 112 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); IND).
24

ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1
(1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (1958).
16 N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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fill the gaps left by the Branzburg decision and by state statutes. The American Newspaper Publishers Association drafted a Free Flow of Information Act which would protect all
persons from disclosing the source or content of any published
or unpublished "information obtained in the gathering, receiving, or processing of information for any medium of communication to the public." The protection would extend to
federal and state proceedings. 27 The bill was introduced in
Congress but it soon became apparent that no such unlimited
privilege would be approved. In the Senate, judiciary subcommittee chairman Sam Ervin preferred his own bill which included the witness-to-a-crime provision which was in the
Oklahoma bill.28 Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, chairman of the House committee considering the bill, was
convinced that an absolute bill would have no chance in Congress.29 The compromise bill reported out of the House committee presented a novel two-tier approach. It would prohibit
a grand jury or other investigating body from requiring a
newsman to testify but would force testimony in a trial court
if the court found his information indispensible to the case and
unavailable from any other source.3 0
It was further apparent that even if an unqualified bill
were to emerge from Congress, Presidnt Nixon would veto it.81
In the light of these legislative prospects, it is clear that
the press cannot expect absolute shield laws. It is also clear
that without press support legislatures will not provide even
qualified laws. So the future of shield legislation depends on
For text of proposal, see EDITOR AN
at 9.
28 NEwswEEK, April 2, 1973, at 57.

27

29 EDITOR AND PUBLISHmR,

30

See summary in

PUBLISHER,

Jan. 6, 1973,

April 21, 1973, at 96.
June 23, 1973, at 13.

EDITOR AND PUBLISHER,

An editorial in the same issue says "the obvious loophole
of 'compelling and overriding public interest' is open to
such wide interpretation by attorneys and jurists as to make
the whole bill an exercise in futility", id., at 6.
31 NEwSwEEK, April 2, 1973, at 58.
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whether the press will agitate for the conditional laws which
the legislatures are willing to pass.
The fact that twenty-one states have shield laws hedged
with such conditions indicates that, at least in the past, newsmen regarded such measures as preferable to no law at all.
Recently, however, there is evident a growing wariness of
such conditional privileges. Sigma Delta Chi, the national
journalism fraternity, an early and vociferous proponent of
shield legislation, noted in a May editorial in its journal that
"More than a few newsmen who once were pushing for an
absolute shield law are now having second thoughts as to
whether this is really the answer to the press' problems with
government." 32 Editor and Publisher, a leading trade journal,
reported that "Whereas, a few months ago majority sentiment
of newspaper editors seem to support an unqualified or absolute bill in Congrss to protect the confidential sources and information of reporters-and to stop the rash of subpoenas,
contempts and jailings - the pendulum appears to have swung
to opposition by the majority of editors to any legislation at
' 33
all in this area.
There are several reasons for this new attitude. First,
shield laws have not provided substantial protection. Second,
newsmen have begun to fear that such statutes furnish a legislative precedent for interference with freedom of the press.
Finally, a review of recent court decisions and a reappraisal
of the Branzburg decision have led press spokesmen to believe that the courts may yet prove a source of protection at
once more certain than statutes and devoid of any meddling
precedents or conditional strings.
In several notable instances shield laws have not provided
sufficient protection. The most notorious cases involving the
jailing of newsmen occurred in states having privilege statutes.
William Farr spent forty-six days in jail because he did not
32 QuILL, May, 1973, at 5.

33 EDITOR

AD

PuBLIsHER, May 19, 1973, at 4.
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qualify for the protection of the California statute, one of the
broadest in the nation8 4 Peter Bridge went to jail for ten days
because of a technical requirement of the New Jersey statute 5 Branzburg himself had the "protection" of a statute in
Kentucky. 36 Courts denied the privilege in these instances
by narrowly construing the statutes. Only in Pennsylvania has
liberal construction been the rule.37 Elsewhere, newsmen have
been held to the letter of the statute.
In a recent speech, Katherine Graham, publisher of the
Washington Post explained press fears of a legislative precedent for interference with the press. Mrs. Graham's remarks
were made shortly after two Post reporters received Pulitzer
prizes for their invstigative reporting of the Watergate scandal, a job that was accomplished without benefit of a shield
law. Mrs. Graham pointed out:
The trouble is that Congress might easily get into the
habit of concerning itself with the press. One indication of this came during recent Senate hearings, when
Senator Gurney of Florida warned that legislation to
protect the press 'provides a precedent for legislation
to regulate it.' is specific thought was a national
commission to establish a code of ethics for journalists
and to investigate claims of unfair coverage. 'We
might call it the Truth in News Commission,' he said.
You don't have to go very far down that road to
see where it leads. If Congress gets too accustomed
to entertaining the press as a petitioner or a special
interest group, we will be in for a stormy season of

34

For a summary of the Farr case see EDITOR AND PUBLISHER,

April, 14, 1973, at 11. A 1973 revision of the California statute clarified the technicality on which Farr was excluded
from the privilege; under the revised statute, Farr would
have qualified for the privilege.
35 In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. April
20, 1973).
86 408 U.S., at 669.
37 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (1958Y.
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review, regulation and friendly
suggestions which
38
could be absolutely disastrous.
Mrs. Graham's views were echoed by Pulitzer-prize-wining investigative reporter Clark Mollenhoff. Mollenhoff explained that the
danger comes in the demands of a large number of
legislators for a definition of 'legitimate newsmen'
and 'legitimate news media' to be shielded from disclosure of confidential sources. Once the definition is
drawn, some person or group of persons will have to
be empowered to determine who are 'legitimate newsmen' and what are 'legitimate news media'.... Any
government role in naming or selecting the men to
make the decision as to who are 'legitimate newsmen' has the major drawback of permitting govern39
ment to have 'a little control' over the press.

Oklahoma, where media support was never unanimous,
opposition focused on this very point. A leader of the opposition to the bill was Ralph Sewall, past national president of
Sigma Delta Chi, part-time Oklahoma City University law
student, and, at the time, assistant managing editor of the
Oklahoma City Times. Sewall stressed his fear that "a shield
law might be the slipping of a bureaucratic nose under the
tent of press freedom." 40
Thus, opinion crystallized that any bill might jeopardize
freedom of the press by establishing the right of legislatures
to tinker with press functions; that, while an absolute privilege might be worth the price, a conditional privilege was
not. Since legislatures seemed unwilling to confer absolute
privileges, newsmen were forced to consider other alternatives.
Address by Katherine Graham, Press-Enterprise Lecture
Series, University of California, Riverside, April 9, 1973.
Printed as pamphlet, Freedom and Responsibility of the
Press, by Press-Enterprise Co., Riverside, Calif., at 12.
,1 Human Events, Feb. 24, 1973, at 14, col. 3.
40 Sewall, Shield Law Could Be Handicap to Newsmen, OKLAHOMA PUBLISHER, January, 1973, at 3.
38

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol9/iss2/5

10

et al.: Legislation Note: House Bill 1363: Testimonial Privilege for News

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9, No. 2

Besides the courts, possibilities for source protection are
reliance on prosecutors' self-restraint and newsmen's promises
to go to jail rather than reveal a source's identity.
The ultimate protection newsmen can offer their sources
is a promise that, rather than reveal, they will go to jail. A
1971 study found that 68.4% of newsmen surveyed said they
41
would go to jail for up to six months to protect news sources.
Another study concluded that the newsman's discretion and
his willingness to go to jail were considered more important
as a guarantee to sources than were legal privileges.42 This
ultimate weapon lost some of its potency last fall when
Los Angeles Times reporter William Farr was given an indefinite sentence for contempt because he refused to say
which of six attorneys in the Charles Manson murder case
leaked information about a Manson plot to kill Frank Sinatra,
Elizabeth Taylor, and other Hollywood celebrities. It seemed
possible that Farr would be locked up until he agreed to reveal his source. Farr was released only by means of a special
order from Justice William 0. Douglas. 43 The possibility of
coercive sentences necessarily weakens the assurances newsmen can give their sources. According to Justice Douglas,
federal law permits no such incarceration by federal courts,44
but he refused to speculate on the legitimacy of the California
45
practice.
There are no reported cases in Oklahoma of newsmen receiving contempt citations, but in other contexts, Oklahoma
courts have ruled indefinite sentences illegal, 40 so the promise to go to jail may be a viable alternative for Oklahoma
newsmen.
41
42

48
44

Blasi, supra note 2, at 276.
Guest and Stanzler, supra note 2, at 45.
Farr v. Pitchess, 409 U.S. 1243 (1973).
Id. But see 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (permitting federal courts to
authorize coercive sentences for the duration of proceed-

ings).

Farr v. Pitchess, 409 U.S. 1243 (1973).
46 Cf. Ex Parte Curtis, 10 Okla. 660, 63 P. 963 (1901); Taylor
v. Newblock, 5 Okla. 647, 49 P. 1114 (1897).
45
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The Nixon administration's answer to the problem of
source protection was to require prosecutors to use self-restraint in subpoenaing or questioning newsmen. The guidelines promulgated by Attorney General John Mitchell declared that the justice department would issue subpoenas only
when there was "sufficient reason" to believe a crime had
been committed, "sufficient reason" to believe the information sought essential to a successful investigation, and an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the information from alternative
nonpress sources. The final paragraph of the guidelines cautioned that "emergencies and other unusual situations may
develop where a subpoena request to the Attorney General
may be submitted which does not exactly conform to these
guidelines. '47 These guidelines, while not dissimilar from the
statutes in several states, obviously do not provide the kind
of certainty which takes the chill off news sources nor anything like the absolute privilege sought by newsmen.
In recent weeks newsmen have turned increasingly to
reconsideration of a judicial solution. Katherine Graham concluded that "In the long run it would seem more prudent for
the press to put its trust in an enlightened public opinion and
the considered second thoughts of the courts."48 A number
of recent decisions gave newsmen reason to believe that the
Branzburg decision was neither so drastic nor so conclusive
as it first appeared.
A recent law review article took the view that the Branzburg decision left room for the courts to grant a testimonial
privilege in the future.49 An analysis of the Branzburg opinion provides some support for this view. The fact is that the
harsh majority opinion in Branzburg was joined by only four
justices. A concurring opinion by Justice Powell emphasized
"the limited nature of the Court's holding." He pointed out
47
48

Dept. of Justice Memo No. 692 (Sept. 2, 1970).
Graham, supra note 36.

49 18 ViL.. L. Rev. 288 (1972). But cf. 4 LOYOLA UmNv. or CHcAGO L.J. 227 (1971).
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"The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury are without constitutional rights with
respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their
sources." Powell went on to espouse a case-by-case balancing
test:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on
its facts by the striking of a proper balance between
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens
to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal
conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and
societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with
the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such
questions.5 0
A District Court in California recently utilized this aspect
of the Branzburg decision. The court granted a newspaper's
request for declaratory relief and an injunction to prevent
police searches of the newspaper's offices. The court refused
to countenance defendants' contention that Branzburg denied
newspapers any special Fourth Amendment rights. Emphasizing that the Branzburg decision "clearly states that the First
Amendment protects newspapers in their newsgathering functions," the court referred to Justice Powell's concurrence and
noted that his "vote was necessary to the Court's judgment."
Relying on a broad interpretation of Branzburg, the court
held that search warrants could not be issued for the purpose
of searching newspaper offices except "when there is a clear
showing that 1) important materials will be destroyed or
removed from the jurisdiction; and 2) a restraining order
would be futile. To stop short of this decision would be to
sneer at all the First Amendment has come to represent in
our society."51
Several other recent decisions encouraged privilege-seekers. A federal judge in the District of Columbia (which has
no shield law) quashed a subpoena sought by the Committee
50 408 U.S., at 709 (concurring opinion).
51 Stanford Daily v. Zucher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 133-135 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
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to Re-Elect the President. The subpoena required reporters for
the Washington Post, New York Times, Washington StarNews, and Time magazine to appear for depositions and to
bring all documents, papers, letters, photographs, and audio
and video tapes relating in any way to the "break-in" or
other political espionage in the Watergate affair. The court
said that it could not "blind itself to the possible 'chilling
effect' the enforcement of the subpoenas would have on the
flow of information to the press and, thus, to the public."
Again citing Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg,
the court ordered that no subpoena would issue without a
demonstration by movants of a "compelling and overriding
interest in the information" sought and inability to obtain
52
the information in other ways.
The Second Circuit upheld a district court's grant of privilege as within the court's discretion. Black plaintiffs representing all Chicago Blacks against sixty sellers of residential
property sought discovery of the identity of the source for a
magazine article on blockbusting. The Second Circuit said that
the privilege grant was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion when the journalist was not a party to the action,
other sources of information were available, and the true
identity of the source did not go to the heart of the claim.5 3
A Georgia court went further than any others by endorsing "the God-given right and constitutional guarantee to
pursue a career without being hampered". The court refused
a law firm's request that a newsman be forced to reveal his
sources for a story about gambling raids on the building
54
housing the law firm.
In Chicago, a federal judge quashed subpoenas issued by
criminal defendants for reporters' tapes, photographs, and
Democratic Nat'l. Comm. v. McCord, 41 U.S.L.W. 2520
(D.D.C. April 22, 1973).
5 Baker v. F &F Invs., 41 U.S.L.W. 2347 (2d Cir. Dec. 7, 1972).
14 Noted in EDITOR AM PUBLISHER, May 26, 1973, at 12.
52
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notes because he found the material "irrelevent and unnecessary" in the preparation of a defense. 55
On the other side of the coin, courts have recently refused the privilege in several situations. In Maryland a newsman was held in contempt when he refused to say where or
from whom he had purchased marijuana in investigating for
a story on drug traffic.56 A New York court held that while
newsmen need not tell a grand jury the identity of any source
who supplied them with information, they must testify about
events which they personally observed, including identities
of persons observed. 57 In Delaware a court denied a news
photographer's motion to quash a subpoena to turn over a
photo taken of the defendant as he was uttering the abusive
language for which he was arrested.5 8 In New Jersey a newsman was forced to reveal all the information given him by a
source when he had published a story revealing part of the
information and the source's identity. 59
While the first set of cases must encourage newsmen, the
existence of the second group indicates that, unless and until
the Supreme Court provides a clearer mandate for the balancing test, the judicial alternative will not provide the security
and certainty required for a free flow of information from
sources.
Without Supreme Court clarification, hope for an ad hoc
court-created privilege may be stymied by the new Federal
Rules of Evidence. The rules do not recognize the newsman's
testimonial privilege.6 01 More important, the rules are stated
5 Noted in EDITOR AND PUmLIsHER, Jan. 20, 1973, at 44.
56 Lightman v. Md., 266 Md. 550, 294 A.2d 149 (Ct. Spec. App.
1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. April 24, 1973).
5 People by Fischer v. Dan, ....N.Y.2d...., ....N.E.2d -, 342
N.Y.S.2d 731 (1973).
58 Petition of McGowan, 298 A.2d 339 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972).
11 In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, Bridge v. N.J., 41 U.S.L.W.
3503 (U.S. April 20, 1973).
(o FED. R. EviD. 501.
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in the negative: a privilege which is not provided in the rules
is not recognized by the rules. Nor is there any provision generally adopting state-created privileges. The advisory committee note to Rule 501 states that state privileges should not
be recognized in federal question litigation nor in federal
criminal prosecutions and, while the court has a choice whether to recognize state privileges in diversity cases, the advisory
committee favors non-recognition. 61
The viability of a judicial alternative depends ultimately
on the Supreme Court, and, more specifically, on Justice Powell. Four justices .strenously opposed the decision in Branzburg.62 Justice Powell's concurring opinion stopped far short
of espousing the hard line of the majority. It does not seem
unlikely that Justice Powell would join the four Branzburg
dissenters in approving a plea for a privilege based on a balancing test.
The shift in opinion among national press spokesmen will
undoubtedly have an impact on the future of the Oklahoma
shield bill. National fervor was crucial to introduction of last
session's bill. Oklahoma newsmen have seldom faced the prospect of grand jury or judicial probing and supporters of the
bill found it difficult to generate much agitation even for the
absolute shield bill.6 Without strong national urging it seems
unlikely that Oklahoma newsmen will press for renewed consideration of the qualified bill defeated last session, and, given
the climate of national opinion, such urging will not be forthcoming.
An interesting alternative for Oklahoma newsmen, and
one that deserves national press consideration, was proposed
by Ralph Sewall, an Oklahoma press spokesman who opposed
shield legislation. Sewall's proposal would protect sources by
providing a jury trial for any person charged with direct conId., Advisory Committee Note.
JJ. Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, Marshall.
1 Interview with Ralph Sewall, June 23, 1973.
81
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tempt." This proposal would cover newsmen who disobeyed
court orders to disclose the identities of sources. Sewall believes that the advantage in his solution is that it would shield
newsmen when they should, in his view, have protectionwhen they expose corruption or when they protect a witness
who fears for his own safety if he appears directly in the
case. Sewall admits that juries probably would not protect
newsmen when they seek to cover up a crime, but Sewall
thinks that newsmen should not be protected in such situations.
Sewall's remedy would give newsmen approximately the
same privilege as the committee version of the Oklahoma bill
and the Ervin bill, but it would give the privilege without
strings. More it would give the privilege to everyone who
could convince a jury that his source deserved protection and
not confine it to persons gainfully employed by regularly
published newspapers having second-class mailing licenses.
It would achieve a qualified privilege without imposing inflexible and precedent-setting limitations and without defining "newsman" or "news media." Presumably, it would
protect the flow of news in areas where the public most needs
facts likely to be available only confidentially - in cases of
governmental and political corruption. The proposal also
avoids a clash with the Federal Rules of Evidence. For all
these reasons, the proposal has much to recommend it.
However, since the privilege would be available only on
a case-by-case, jury-by-jury basis, the proposal does not offer
sources the prior certainty of anonymity which is said to be
necessary for the free flow of information. Of course, this objection applies to all measures except absolute privilege statutes.
A more serious problem with the Sewall proposal is that
it would require an unprecedented abrogation of a court's
64

Sewall, supra note 40.
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power to summarily punish direct contempts. 65 Historically,
such power has been regarded as inherent in the courts and
as essential to protect their dignity and smooth administration. Today the power has been somewhat eroded by the
Supreme Court's declaration that a jury trial is required for
non-petty contempts. 66 Even so, it seems unlikely that the legislature will lightly deprive the courts of this power and it
is by no means certain that the courts would find such legislation valid. These are formidible problems, requiring extensive examination. Here it is important only to note that in
the difficult area of newsmen's testimonial privileges the Sewall proposal seems to offer the best solution for confidential
sources, newsmen, and the public.

61 The law in the contempt area is confused. It is not clear
whether a newsman's refusal to disclose a source is a civil
or criminal contempt. This determination is crucial to discussion of the propriety of summary punishment, the right
to a jury trial, and the possibility of coercive sentences.
A jury trial is guaranteed for non-petty criminal contempts.
Frank v. U.S., 395 U.S. 147, reh, den., 396 U.S. 869 (1969). It
is not clear when jury trial is available for non-criminal
contempts. Coercive sentences have been traditionally used
in civil contempts but not in criminal ones. Thus if a contempt is classified as "direct criminal" it implies the possibility of summary punishment, but not for more than six
months or $500; otherwise, a jury trial is guaranteed; and
it seems to imply that no coercive sentence will be imposed.
A "direct civil contempt" is not clearly susceptible to summary punishment, but neither is a jury trial clearly guaranteed, and coercive punishments are a real possibility.
68 Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, reh. denied, 396 U.S.
869 (1969).
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